

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 193876

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

S E C R E T STATE 193876

NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT KABUL 5307, SENT SECSTATE AUG 15, 1975:

QUOTE S E C R E T KABUL 5307

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PK, SOV, AF

SUBJ: PAK REPORT OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN TERRITORIAL DEMANDS

REF: A. STATE 192559 (NODIS); B. ISLAMABAD 7433 (NODIS).

1. SUMMARY: AGREE WITH ISLAMABAD THAT USE OF SOVIET EMBASSY IN KABUL TO THREATEN PAKISTANIS IS BIZARRE, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING "HAS BEEN" CALIBRE OF RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP IN THEIR AFGHAN MISSION HERE. THREATS MAY REFLECT USSR CONCERN THAT RECENT AFGHAN INTERNAL DISTURBANCES THREATEN DAOUD REGIME AND HENCE AFFECT RUSSIAN POSITION. EMBASSY KABUL DOES NOT THINK AFGHAN ARMY POSES A THREAT TO PAKISTAN. WE WONDER WHETHER IT POSSIBLE THAT AZIZ AHMAD HAS EXAGGERATED AN INFORMAL AND LOCAL RUSSIAN WARNING TO PAKS IN ORDER TO LEND FURTHER IMPETUS TO PROGRESS ON ACQUISITION

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PAGE 02 STATE 193876

U.S. ARMS. END SUMMARY.

2. KABUL STARTLED AT STORY REGARDING SOVIET DEMARCHE TO  
PAKS HERE. WE WOULD NOT HAVE BELIEVED THAT SOVIETS WOULD  
INDULGE IN THIS KIND OF CRUDE BRINKSMANSHIP.

A. IT WOULD BE MOST UNUSUAL THAT SOVIETS WOULD  
DISPATCH THEIR COUNSELLOR OF EMBASSY TO TALK TO PAK  
CHARGE IN FIRST INSTANCE ON SUCH A CRITICAL MATTER.  
THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE SINCE SOVIET MINISTER  
COUNSELLOR ALEKSANDR A. NOVOKRESHCHENOV GIVES EVERY  
SIGN OF BEING AN INCOMPETENT AND A NON-ENTITY.  
NOVKRESHCHENOV WAS COUNSELLOR AND CHARGE IN KABUL  
FROM 1960 TO 1963, COUNSELLOR AGAIN IN KABUL FROM 1967  
UNTIL ABOUT 1970. HE RETURNED TO KABUL IN 1973.  
NOVKRESHCHENOV HAS ALMOST NO PERSONALITY, MUMBLES  
AND, IN OUR EXPERIENCE, HAS NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE  
TO SAY ON ANY MATTER.

B. EMBASSY ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR IN KABUL,  
NEKSANDR PUZANOV, IS THAT HE IS FORMERLY POWERFUL IN-  
DIVIDUAL WHOSE STAR REACHED ZENITH IN LAST DAYS OF  
STALIN REGIME. AFTER THAT HE SWITCHED TO OUTWARDLY  
MORE IMPOSING, BUT ACTUALLY LESS INFLUENTIAL CHAIRMAN-  
SHIP OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. HIS DECLINE SINCE THEN  
APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN STEADY. IN SHORT, A STALINIST  
WHO LOST OUT UNDER KRUSHCHEV AND HAS NOT APPARENTLY  
STAGED A COMEBACK UNDER BREZHNEV. EMBASSY BELIEVES  
THAT PUZANOV HAS NEITHER THE IMAGINATION, LICENSE,  
CLOUT OR INITIATIVE TO MAKE THE DEMARCHE DESCRIBED  
BY AZIZ AHMAD WITHOUT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW.

C. HOWEVER, ONE POSSIBLE BASIS FOR SUCH A SOVIET DEMARCHE  
TO PAKS IN KABUL MAY BE SOVIET FEARS THAT AFGHAN PRESIDENT  
DAOUD IS IN TROUBLE AS A RESULT OF THE JULY 1975 PANJSHIR  
INSURGENCY (FYI - US EMBASSY KABUL DOES NOT THINK THAT  
DAOUD WAS SERIOUSLY THREATENED. END FYI) AND THE INTERNAL  
UNREST THAT THESE EVENTS SIGNIFY. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PROB-  
ABLY HAS INFORMATION -- CERTAINLY EXAGGERATED IF IT CAME  
FROM AFGHAN INVOLVEMENT IN THESE INCIDENTS.  
(EMBASSY, TOO, CONSIDERS THERE DISTINCT POSSI-  
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PAGE 03 STATE 193876

BILITY OF AT LEAST UNOFFICIAL PAK BLESSING FOR AFGHANS  
INVOLVED IN JULY PROBLEMS). SOVIETS MAY FEEL THAT MAIN  
ALTERNATIVE TO DAOUD IS A RIGHT-WING, RELIGIOUS REGIME  
WHICH THEY WOULD VIEW AS UNACCEPTABLE TO SOVIET INTERESTS.  
IF THE ABOVE IS CORRECT, SOVIETS COULD HAVE ORDERED PUZANOV  
TO PUT THE PAKS IN NOTICE THAT FURTHER MEDDLING IN AFGHAN-  
ISTAN IS UNACCEPTABLE.

D. AZIZ AHMAD'S REPORT OF SOVIET COMMENTS ON DURAND LINE ARE OMINOUS SINCE ALL PREVIOUS INDICATIONS WE HAVE HERE ARE THAT SOVIETS HAVE LONG SINCE GIVEN "DE FACTO" RECOGNITION TO DURAND LINE AND LINKAGE OF THIS WITH A RUSSIAN SUGGESTION THAT PAKISTANIS RELINQUISH TERRITORY TO THE AFGHANS IS A MAJOR CHANGE OF SIGNALS.

E. IF SOVIETS HAVE FEAR FOR FUTURE OF GANDHI REGIME IN INDIA, THEN THIS CRUDE DEMARCHE MIGHT BE PART OF A SOVIET PLAN TO KEEP PAKS DISTRACTED ON AFGHAN BORDER.

3. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE AFGHAN ARMY, EVEN WITH THE LARGE SOVIET ASSISTANCE OF RECENT YEARS, IS CAPABLE OF POSING A VIABLE THREAT TO PAKISTAN. LACK OF COMBINED ARMS TRAINING, INABILITY TO FORMULATE DETAILED OPERATIONS PLANS AND POOR LOGISTICAL BACK-UP SHOULD RULE OUT AN OFFENSIVE VENTURE OF ITS OWN. HOWEVER, COORDINATED WITH A POSSIBLE, IF UNLIKELY ATTACK BY INDIA, GOA ARMED FORCES COULD PLAY SOME ROLE AND WOULD, OF COURSE, TIE DOWN SOME OF THE PAK ARMY IN THE WEST AND NORTHWEST OF PAKISTAN.

4. WE WONDER WHETHER ISLAMABAD THINKS THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY THAT AZIZ AHMAD DECIDED TO PLACE THE MOST OMINOUS AND FORMAL INTERPRETATION POSSIBLE ON WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN HARD-LINE MUTTERINGS BY PUZANOV AND NOVOKRESHCHENOV IN KABUL DESIGNED TO WARN THE PAKS TO KEEP THEIR HANDS OFF DAOUD AND HIS REGIME. SUCH AN INTERPRETATION BY AHMAD COULD BE STIMULATED, AS AMBASSADOR BYROADE POINTS OUT, BY PAKISTANI CONCERNS OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA AND THE SLOW PACE OF ARMS SALES NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

5. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT TO ISLAMABAD, MOSCOW  
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PAGE 04 STATE 193876

AND NEW DELHI. CURRAN UNQUOTE. KISSINGER

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## Message Attributes

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